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Cooperation  with  the  republics  of the  former  USSR under  the  existing 
contractual framework  · 
Cooperation in the field of safeguards (Safeguards Directorate) 
Cooperation in the framework of Technical Assistance· lNlRODUCUQN 
On 7 September 1994 the Commission adopted a communication to the Council and Parliament 
on the subject of  the illegal trade in radioactive substances and nuclear materials (COM(94)383). 
In it the Commission proposed that the EU's response focus  on: 
(i)  improving the  operating conditions  in the  nuclear sectors  of the  countries  concerned 
(cooperation  under  the  aegis  of Tacis,  the  Moscow-based  International  Science  and 
Technology Centre and the Euratom Safeguards Directorate); 
(ii)  dialogue and cooperation with the countries concerned under the various agreements and 
in the context of the common external and security policy; 
(iii)  greater cooperation within the EU (customs cooperation and tighter checks, cooperation 
in  the  context  of justice  and  home  affairs  policy,  and  coordination  of industrial 
assistance). 
1l1is issue was given high priority under the German Presidency.  Five Council working parties 
plus the embassies of the cmmtries concerned were mobilized to prepare a report for the Essen 
European  Council,  which declared  its  concern about  the  smuggling of nuclear  material  and 
approved a number of measures  and  !,JUidclincs  aimed at  tackling the  problem.  It asked the 
Commission and the Member States to step up cooperation in this field and to give the countries 
of  origin and of transit effective support for their efforts on the grmmd.  It also asked all states 
that had not yet done so to place sensitive civilian materials (plutoniwn and enriched uranium) 
tmdcr international control. 
'I11c Commission and the Member States have continued work since the swnmit, liaising with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other relevant bodies.  These ciTorts arc spurred 
by the common interest of the European Union, the Central and Eastern European and former 
Soviet countries in this issue, and take the form of  cooperation ba..c;cd on specific projects within 
an overall framework. 
'I11c European Parliament has displayed an tmOagging interest in the issue of illicit trafficking. 
MEPS  have supported the  Commission's initiatives by taking part in conferences and  making 
visits.  Budgetary  resources  have  been  allocated  for  operations  in  the  Central  and  Eastern 
European and former Soviet cmmtries. 
Titis  p:tpcr  drscribes  w1L1t  lms  been  done  by  way  of  follow-up  to  the  Commission's 
communication of September 1994 and the conclusionli of the Essen Summit. 
I.  NUCLFAR 1JlAFFJOqNf. 1N 199S 
Few  cases  of nuclear  tratTicking  have  come  to  light  since  publication of the  Commission's 
commtmication of September 1994 but ille!,ml imports of radioactive steel scrap and of illegally 
dumped radioactive sources arc on the increase, as arc ca..c;cs involving trafficking of  radioactive 
substances, blackmail attempts and hoaxes. 
ll1e Commission's data bank currently contains 33 reported nuclear-related ca..c;es, most of  them 
in Germany.  1l1c Commission has been led to understand, however, through inter-institutional 
channels, that this list is not exhaustive.  A few cases have not yet been formally notified to the 
Commission, as they should have been under the Euratom Treaty.  1l1e probable reasons for this 
arc: 
a lack of  awareness of this specific provision of the Treaty on the part of those making 
seizures; 
a  concern  to  maintain  confidentiality  so  that  inquiries  still  under  way  will  not  be 
jeopardized; 
I  a/) a desire of  judicial authorities to prevent interference by the executive in cases still before 
the courts. 
The Commission has become aware of this state of affairs only recently and,  in an attempt to 
remedy the situation, has embarked on an information campaign among the Member States to 
encourage them to adopt a procedure for declaring cases in accordance with the requirements and 
time-limits  laid  down  in  the  Regulations,  while  receiving  an  assurance  of the  necessary 
confidentiality. 
And while the mnnber of  new such cases is apparently dwindling in the EU and Europe generally, 
the most noteworthy case so  h1f was discovered in December 1994 by the Czech police, who 
arrested smugglers in possession of nearly three kilos of uranium oxide with an isotope content 
of  high strategic value (uranium 235) close on 87%.  Military quality is usually at the 93% mark. 
An import'lllt distinction must he dmwn between the legal fmmcworl<S  governing the 
m'lterials in question, IL'lmCiy (simplifying somcwh.'lt) between: 
nuclear m'lterials, which are m'lterials subject to safcgu.'lnls under the Eumtom 
Treaty, the IAEA or the Nuclear Non-Pmlifemtion fuaty (NP1) because they 
pose a risk- great or small, depending on the m'ltcrial - of direct or indirect 
military tt'\e: these m'ltcrials (e.g.  plutonium and highly-enriched ur.mium) arc very 
rumgemu~t ~md could lead to nuclear pmlifemtion a'\ well as cont'lllliiL'ltion; 
mdioactive sub;tances, which arc not subject to safeguanls: the risk of imtdiation 
derives fmm the mdiation emitted by the subit'Ulce but the substance itself cannot 
be u'\ed a'\ a fuel  in its present state. 
II.  ffiNffiOL ON NUCLF.AR MA mRIAlS 
1.  Common  foreign and security policy 
The EU has  smmdcd out non-member countries on this  issue,  notably in connection with the 
implementation of  the joint action on the preparation of  the 1995 conference on the review and 
extension of  the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the appeal to all states that had not yet done 
so  to  place  sensitive  materials  for  civilian  usc  (plutonium  and  enriched  uranitnn)  under 
international control. 
In follow-up to this joint action,  the  EU is  focusing  its diplomatic cfTorts  on the oqjcctive of 
achieving universal application of  the NPT and strengthening the international system of  nuclear 
safcf,ruards (the IAEA's 93+2 programme). 
2.  Safeguards Directorate 
Since the end of 1994 the Safeguards Directorate has been trying to establish links with other 
bodies working on the problem with the aim of exchanging information and creating synergy. 
In practical terms, there have been few confiscations of  nuclear materials since the Munich airport 
case and it has not proved necessary to send inspectors. 
Its  administrative  workload  has  been  heavy,  however.  TI1c  Directorate  is  responsible  for 
transmitting all information to the national authorities and the Joint Research Centre in good time. 
Furthermore, in respect of materials seized and stored, it must also ensure that all Chapter VII 
requirements of  the Euratom Treaty, which are incumbent on any holder of  nuclear materials, arc 
complied with. 
2 3.  Cooperation between non-member countries and the Safeguards Directorate 
The September 1994 commtmication described the programme of  cooperation between Safeguards 
Directorate and the Russian Federation set up at the end of 1992.  The short-term aim of this 
cooperation was to devise, set up and nm a modem system of  nuclear material accotmtancy and 
control.  Parliament approved an allocation ofECU 1.8 million tmder this heading (B4-2001) for 
1995.  TI1is programme has fitted in very well with other projects nm by Commtmity, national 
and industrial bodies. 
TI1e initial phase was successfully completed at the end of 1994 and focused on: 
training Rw;sian experts in accotmting, supervision and control of  materials for Russians; 
inspection exercises in real on-site conditions; 
courses on the usc of measuring instnuncnts and computers. 
These  basic  activities  continued  in  1995,  complemented  by  intensive  training  courses  (two 
months) for  groups of four or five in Luxembourg. 
L'lfger-scalc projects arc also being implemented: Russian specialists and Euratom inspectors join 
forces as a team to achieve a specific goat' in respect of selected groups of installations or areas 
of Russia chosen by the Russians. 
TI1cse activities and the main projects tmder way are described in Annex 2.  One operation is 
particularly noteworthy since it was a "first": in November 1995 a team of Euratom inspectors 
was  invited to join a Russian team to carry out,  not  an exercise,  but a real  inspection of two 
installations in the Dimitrovgrad region.  It gave rise to an extremely fruitful exchange of  know-
how. 
4.  Role of the Joint Rcsenrch Centre 
Since  1994 the JRC  in the form of its Institute for Transuraniu:m Elements (ITIJ) has  made a 
number of contributions to etrorts to combat trafficking in nuclem materials: 
(a)  It confirmed its role as a laboratory for analysing the materials seized, in particulm by: 
the isotopic analysis of the materials seized at Munich airport; 
the  comparative  analysis  of highly  enriched  uranitun  seized  in  Prague  and 
Lmdshut; 
the analysis of uranitun seized at Mannhcim; 
the analysis of  suspect radioactive substances for the German authorities and for 
the Italian authorities. 
(b)  A number of  courts have called on its expertise,  the most significant instances being the 
Munich,  Lmdshut,  Konstanz  and  BC>blingen  cases  but  there  were  also  six others  in 
Germ.my. 
(c)  TI1e German authorities have asked the ITU to Orf,'llilizc a seminar to inform the federal 
and L1nd authorities about the handling and analysis of  substances liable to be smuggled. 
(d)  The same authorities (Btmdeskriminalamt and the Dundesamt ftir Strahlenschutz) have 
called on the ITUs expertise to design preventive measures to deal with the packets of 
nuclear  materials  associated  with  chemical  ex11losives  and  in  particular  to  study 
procedures to track these packets.  It is currently working on appropriate techniques to 
do this. 
(c)  It is continuing work on setting up a data bank on the chmacteristics of  nuclear materials. 
\Vith  the  Commission's  help,  Russian  specialists  will  come  to  the  JTU  to  provide 
inform.1tion on the fuel  cycle and so maximize its effectiveness. 
(f)  An international technical working party on nuclear trafficking (set up on the mmgins of 
the P8) has decided to latmch a rotmd robin test to improve methods of identifying the 
origin of the  materials  seized  and  lms  drawn  up  a work  programme  for  stepping up 
cooperation, especially as regards to the measures to be taken in situ when such materials 
3 arc fotmd.  TI1c Commtmity and some member and non-member cotmtrics' arc involved 
in the working party, which last met in Karlsruhe on  1 February 1996. 
5.  Technical assistance cooperation 
TI1C Commission explained in its commtmication of September 1994 that it had decided to use some 
Phare  and  Tacis  ftmds  to  finance  technical  assistance  in  support  of the  efforts  of the  cotmtries' 
concerned to  improve  controls  on nuclear materials.  This  decision,  confirmed  in  1995,  won  the 
tmanimous support of  the Member States at the meeting of  the Phare-Tacis Management Committee. 
Details of the projects can be found in Annex 3.  · 
(a)  In accordance with the conclusions of  the Essen Summit, the priority for Commtmity aid has 
been training in the framework of  the Ru'>sian Methodological and Training Centre (RMfC) 
of Obninsk, the setting-up of which was officially annotmccd by the Russian authorities in 




A detailed study of the RMfC course specifications is being drawn up with financing from 
the  1994 Tacis budget and terms of  reference have been agreed by the JRC, the Ministry of 
Atomic Energy (MINATOM), the federal inspectorate (Gosatomnadzor) and those in charge 
of the  l~1cis programme. 
But without waiting for the conclusions of this study the first round of invitations of tender 
to fill  five posts was lmmchcd on the basis of a feasibility study and the first courses were 
given early this year.  More ambitious invitations to industry to tender for the instruments 
needed by the RMfC will be published as soon as the detailed  ~tudy is concluded.  TI1c JRC 
is acting as overall project leader, in close liaison with the appointed Russian cotmterparts. 
'fl1is  project  is  conceived  in  a very  different  perspective  from  the  courses  and  seminars 
organised in the CIS and Central and Eastern European countries by the EU, the IAEA and 
other partners to serve more immediate goals.  The RMfC should be seen as a longer-term 
project to set up infrastructure that will enable the Ru'>sians, and perhaps other countries, to 
asstm1c responsibility for nuclear materials accotmtancy and control  themselves. 
If the Russian authorities and operators arc to provide effective accountancy and control of 
nuclear materials at the basic installation level, a great deal of  equipment will be needed that 
can only be designed and produced by Russian industry.  To this end, a detailed study of  the 
possibilities will be tmdertaken shortly.  The bulk of the work will be done by the Russians 
themselves but the study itself will be carried out in the framework oftripartite Russia-EU-US 
cooperation with a view to drawing on the results of the "L1b to L1b" ab'Tccmcnts with the 
Americans. 
A detailed study will be carried out on the setting-up of a metrology centre for MINATOM 
and an analysis centre for GOSATOMNADZOR on the lines of  the European centres (IRMM, 
ITU and JRC).  TI1csc two centres will be housed in the premises of  the Moscow Institute of 
Inorganic Materials. 
TI1c ITU's know-how will be made available to the Plk1rc programme so that the authorities 
and laboratories of the Central and Eastern European cotmtrics can be given advice on the 
handling, treatment and analysis of  errant nuclear materials.  Specific requests for such help 
have been received from the Hungarian and Czech authorities.  TI1e terms of reference for 
technical assistance to these two countries tmder the Plk1re progran1mc have been ab'Tecd.  ll1c 
Bulgarian,  Polish  and  Ukrainian  authorities  have  also  expressed  great  interest  in  such 
assistance.  TI1e Pharc-Tacis management committee approved it in principle in September 
1995. 
4 6.  International  Science and Technology Center 
TI1e Moscow Centre for Science and Technology has been up and running since March  1994.  Its 
pmpose is to convert the skills of  armament specialists for usc in non-military purposes.  The Centre 
draws up; approves, finances and supervises scientific and technical projects for pacific pmposes, first 
and foremost for Russian institutions and installations but also in the former Soviet republics, should 
these  countries  express  interest.  'n1e  Centre's  projects  may  concern  measmes  for  the  physical 
protection and accounting of fissile materials that draw on the know-how of  scientists of the former 
Soviet Union. 
One  of the  most  interesting projects  (cf annexe  3)  is  one  to  combat  illicit  trafficking in nuclear 
materials: the TOMSK/40 project concerns system design for safeguarding nuclear materials utilized 
at complex nuclear facilities (cost USD 815 000) and involves the development of  a new approach to 
safep1ards in a reprocessing plant. 
TI1e JRC is working with the Los Alamos National L'lb and JAERI of Japan in a group responsible 
for the technical coordination of the Centre's project 40.  This covers: 
appropriate techniques for destmctive and non-destmctive measmcs; 
interaction between the accountancy system for installation materials and the regional control 
authority; 
the planning of inspections and evaluation of their ellectiveness. 
ll1c JRC  is  also  providing assistance  for  a project  in Kazakhstan  to  set  up  a complete prototype 
storage ntcility at Baikal1 that will include surveillance and physical protection and an NMAC system. 
A centre similar to the TCST (USTC) has been set up in Ukraine by Canada,  Sweden, the US and 
Ukraine.  Tt began work in May )a..<;t year.  Its Western partners have contributed some USD 14 million 
(the US  10 million, C.'umda 5 million and Sweden 1.5 million).  TI1c EU is planning to contribute an 
amount yet to be decided (ECU 3 to 5 million). 
7.  Cooperation fi·om EU Memhcr States 
All operations arc the subject of  detailed and repdar consultations between the Member States and the 
Commission.  'fl1c  aid  provided by  some  Member States  since  1992  has  mainly consisted  in  the 
organization of seminars and exchanges of experts with the former Soviet countries.  More concrete 
projects arc also starting up, examples being the direct cooperation between a reprocessing plant in 
the  UK.  (BNPL)  and  one  in  Russia  (Mayak  RT-1)  and  between  French  (EDF)  and  Russian 
(Rosatomcncrgo)  nuclear power stations.  Sweden,  Finland  c:md  Germany have concentrated their 
efforts in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the Baltic states, and in particular the development of a local 
accmmtancy system for nuclear materials. 
Finland, which has a 1200 km border with Russia, maintains close contacts with Russian federal and 
regional authorities so that it can constantly monitor the risks and strengthen border controls, both by 
helping the Russians and by developing its own installations. 
8.  Coopcmtion with the United States 
A new Ematom-US Department of Energy agreement to cooperate on nuclear p1arantees R&D was 
signed on 6 January 1995 by Mr Contzen of the Commission on behalf of  Ematom and Mr Kclihcr 
for the DOE.  TI1e agreement provides for "scientific coordination of  both parties in efforts to transfer 
nuclear  safq,ruard  technologies  to  other  cmmtrics,  upon  their  request,  in  order  to  improve  the 
effectiveness of  their national  safep~ards systems".  Talks with the DOE and representatives of  m<Uor 
laboratories showed that the Americans arc keen to work closely with the Community and cnsme that 
efforts arc complementary,  so avoiding overlaps and optimizing the usc made of limited financial 
rcsomces.  The study on what can be offered by MTNATOM and Russian industry is a good example 
5 of  this.  Cooperation will now extend to training where there will true interaction between separate 
projects: 
usc of safeguards in a plant converting uranium and producing fuel; 
development of  instruments for measuring, identifying and maintaining surveillance of  nuclear 
materials; 
training operators and inspectors; 
close  technical  cooperation  concerning analysis  procedures,  reference  materials  and  new 
methods of defining suspect consignments. 
III.  RADTOPRUfECJlON ASPECTS 
Smuggling and other illegal or uncontrolled activities with radioactive susbtanccs or nuclear material 
imposes considerable danger to the public and the environment. Most of the radioactive contraband 
that  has  been  confiscated  or  detected  by  Member  States  authorities  were  radioactive  sources, 
substances for industrial or medical use and contaminated metal scrap. Since the competent authorities 
of the Member States recognized the seriousness of the dangers arising from illicit nuclear traffic, 
many efforts arc being made in order to attack the problem. Many of  these activities are executed in 
close cooperation with the Commission. 
I.  !&gal initiatives 
Basic Safety Standards: the performance of  an effective combat against the illicit nuclear trade 
is much depending on the legal situation in the Union, in Member States as well as in third 
countries.  The  Member  States  subsume  trading  with  radioactive  substances  in  different 
legislations and consequently violations arc prosecuted and punished dif1crently. In the Central 
Europe;m and Eastern cmmtries and cmmtrics of  the CIS, most of  the nationallcf,rislations arc 
in transitory situations, changing from old soviet-law to individual national legislation. 
Within the  EU,  this  unequal  legal  consideration of trading in radioactive  substances  may 
change  when  the  new  Basic  Safety  Standard<>  will  be  in  force.  It enlarges  the  field  of 
application of  European radiation protection legislation. The new Article 2 incladcs import and 
e)l.:port into and from the EU. It provides the advantage that national regulations in relation to 
import into the EU of  radioactive substances may be harmonized. The Commission has invited 
Member States authorities to a meeting in July 1996 in order to discuss possibilities to reach 
this objective. Consequently, it will be more difficult for professional dealers to find pathways 
through different European  legislation in order to establish networks for  illegal trading in 
radioactive substances. 
Furthermore, Article 45 of  the Basic Safety Standards Directive at present in force provides 
that Member States shall stipulate measures to be taken by the competent authorities with 
respect to health ofthe population and in particular of  groups ofthc population who arc liable 
to receive a dose in excess of the limits. 
Directive  on Information of the  Public:  complementary to Article  45  of the Basic  Safety 
Standards, the Cmmcil enacted a Directive on the information of the public in the event of  a 
radiological emergency. As defined by Article 2 of  this Directive, illicit trade and trafficking 
in radioactive susbstanccs and nuclear material is not directly considered as a situation where 
a nuclear emergency requires the Member States to take special initiatives and actions in order 
to safeguard the health of  the population. This Directive will undergo revision when the new 
Basic  Safety  Standards  will  be  adopted  by  the  Cmmcil.  The  Commission  will  take  this 
opportunity to discuss to what extent illicit trade should be covered by this Directive. 
6 2.  Coopemtion with international organizations 
1l1e EU cooperates with the IAEA inter alia on ways of detecting radioactive substances at 
borders,  and  sends  information to  the  IAEA database  listing seizures  of such substances 
worldwide.  The  IAEA  h  ..  1S  worked  well  as  a  clearing  house  for  this  purpose,  and  the 
Commission for its part lk1S often been instrumental in advancing the work there. Participants 
lk'lve on a number of  occasions expressed enthusiasm for the results, which can be smnmarizcd 
as follows: 
exchange of information on initiatives under way in related fields; 
organiZ:'ltion of  joint activities including seminars, information packages, draf1:ing of 
procedures to be followed in the event of problems; 
creation of an informal network of contacts accessible at any time. 
TI1e last-mentioned is of  particular importance given that a notable feature of  the discussions 
and meetings dealing with nuclear traflicking is the sheer range of  participants involved, from 
many different walks of life. Apart from police and other representatives dealing with these 
issues  as  a  matter  of course  there  may  be  spokesmen  representing  corporate  interests 
concerned with protection of  employees or of their particular sector. Representatives of the 
WCO (World Customs Organization), lATA (International Air Transport Association), the 
ICAO (International Civil Aviation 0rf,'ai1iZ:1tion), IF  ALP  A (International Federation of  Air 
Line  Pilots  Associations),  the  IMO  (International  Maritime  OrganiZ:'ltion),  INfERPOL, 
EUROPOL and the UPU (Universal Postal Union) may be seated rmmd a table with the UN, 
the IAEA and the Commission. 
IV.  CUSffiM"' COOPERATION 
1.  On  22  November  1994  the  Directors-General  of Cm;toms  approved  a twin-track  action 
programme drawn up by the Commission involving tighter controls at the external frontier and 
measures to combat actual traflicking. A mm1ber of steps have subsequently been taken: 
(a)  At  a meeting on 9 and  10  February  1995  the  Commtmity's  Deputy Directors-General  of 
Customs approved a draf1: paper on general risk analysis f,TUidelines and called for the emplk1Sis 
to be placed on application of these techniques to nuclear materials. A section on sensitive 
products, including nuclear materials, is accordingly to be added to the guidelines and the plan 
is ultimately,  in liaison with the other Commission departments concerned, to draw up risk 
analysis sheets for this among other fields. 
(b)  As part of  the MAffi-IEUS Programme the Commission organized a seminar in Vienna (23-
25 October 1995) on the radiological aspects of  nuclear traflicking. TI1is was attended by over 
90 participants from EU countries,  15 Central and East European countries and the CIS, and 
provided an opportunity to draw the attention of  all concerned to the issue of  radioprotection; 
it is to be followed up by special training courses for customs officals from EU Member States 
and the Central European countries concerned. These will take place over the next few months 
in Member States sharing borders with f:ast European countries. Already the Commission has 
collaborated with the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety to hold two courses for 
a total of 50  custom~ officers, and similar courses arc to be nm shortly by the Austrian and 
French authorities. Plans arc also being disct.L~scd for similar projects in the UK, Denmark and 
Italy.  The  aim of these  courses,  which  deal  with the  ll~e of measuring equipment for  the 
detection of radioactive substances and  other nuclear materials,  is  to upgrade  the  skills of 
customs officers responsible for controls at the frontiers. 
(c)  Customs have been ii:Ivitcd to make greater use of the SCENT/CIS electronic mail network 
which links the Commission and 350 terminals throughout the Commtmity and allows the 
direct  real-time  exchange  of operational  information  on  ]mown  or  suspected  cases  of 
traflicking. 
7 2.  The Commission is also preparing a brochure for customs departments which will provide 
officials directly with practical information for usc in suspicious cases. 
3.  TI1e Commission's technical assistance to CIS countries under the Tacis programme includes 
measures to control nuclear tmfficking.  It has already supplied detection equipment (eight 
radiation testers to Kazakhstan and five to Uk.Taine) and plans further operations of  this type. 
Under the Phare programme the Commission approved a programme in November to facilitate 
transit  which  incorporates  technical  assistance  for  the  prevention  of nuclear  traffiicking. 
Requirements in this and other fields are currently being assessed.  · 
4.  TI1c  cm;toms  mutual  assistance  protocols  to  the  various  agreements  concluded  by  the 
Community (alone or jointly with the Member States) with non-member (e.g.  Central/East 
European and CIS) countries provide the authorities in the contracting parties with a basis for 
administrative cooperation in the fight against trafficking of  nuclear materials and radioactive 
substances. Since the entry into force of  the interim agreements with Russia and Ukraine on 
1 Febnmry, the protocols can be used for cooperation with those cotmtrics on matters covered 
by the Euratom Treaty. 
5.  TI1c Commission is negotiating customs coopcmtion agreements with the Community's main 
trading partners  (the  United States  and  C'U1ada)  which  include  mutual  assistance  clauses 
covering the areas governed by Commtmity provisions, including matters coming tmder the 
Euratom Treaty. It also cooperates with the United States in this field,  inter alia on training 
for relevant oflicials, in the context of regular bilateral contacts on customs matters. 
V.  !JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIR.~ 
1.  As  proposed  in the  report  on  illicit traflic  in radioactive  substances  and nuclear material 
presented to the European Cotmcil of Essen in December 1994, the mandate of the Europol 
Drugs  Unit  (Europol's  forenmner  tmtil  the  ratification  of the  Europol  Convention)  was 
e:\.iendcd to illicit traflicking in radioactive and nuclear substances by a Joint Action of the 
Council  in March  1995.  TI1e EDU has held a workshop of law enforcement officials from 
Member States in which seizures have been made and has organised a European Conference 
on  illicit  traflicking  with  experts  from  the  MS,  the  Commission  and  International 
Organisations on 26/27 October 1995. At this Conference, the experts recommended several 
projects for the EDU hy which the cooperntion and exchange of information among Member 
States can be improved (creation of  an immediate notification system on seizures, installation 
of  a EU L1w Enforcement Database, updated list of  competent national agencies, quaterl y EU 
situation Report, threat a<>sessment analysis, comparative study of  national legal instruments, 
equipment review). When the Europol Convention docs come into force, illicit traflicking in 
nuclear  and  radioactive  sustances  continues  to  be  one  of Europol's ·important  objectives. 
According  to  Article  2 § 2 Europol  shall  initially  act  to  prevent  and  combat  unlawful 
traflicking in nuclear and radioactive susbstances. As set out in the annex to the Convention 
"crime connected with nuclear and/or radioactive materials" means the criminal ofTences listed 
in Article 7 (1) of  the Convention on the Physical Protection ofNuclear Material of 1980 and 
relating to the nuclear and/or radioactive materials defined in Article  197 of the Euratom 
Treaty and Directive 80/836 Euratom of 15 July 1980. 
Further work among Member States in the third pillar in 1995 related to a first evaluation of 
a questionnaire on details about the fight against illicit trafficking which had been distributed 
by the  German Presidency.  It shows  diflcrences  with regard to  the  threat assessement  in 
general, the existence of  permanently installed technical equipment at land borders, seaports 
and airports as  well  with regard to bilateral agreements with the CEEC and the  CIS.  TI1e 
proposals for possible actions within the EO, as agreed by the Steering Group II and endorsed 
8 by K4 Committee  in November  1994,  have  partly  been  examined  and  endorsed  by  the 
European Conference of the Europol Drug Unit.  · 
TI1e Italian Presidency wishes to organize during the first semester of 1996 a seminar on the 
illicit traffic of nuclear material  and radioactives  susbtances  in the framework of custom'> 
cooperation tmder Title VI of the TEU. 
2.  With regard to the cooperation with third States, the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers of 
the EU and the CEEC met for a Conference on Combatting Drug Crime and organized Crime 
in Europe in September 1994 in Berlin. TI1ey declared to develop the cooperation inter alia 
in the fight against crimes involving radioactive and nuclear material and agreed to examine 
certain means of cooperation as preparation of  joint situation assessment, cooperation with 
regard  to  the  protection of radioactive  and  nuclear  stocks,  the  setting up  of coordinated 
reporting  channels  and  mutual  assistance  of the  prosecuting authorities.  In  Jtme  1995,  a 
seminar of the EU Member Sates and the CEEC on police cooperation to combat drugs and 
organised  crime  was  held  as  part  of the  structured  dialogue  \\hich specified methods  of 
cooperation in different fields of organised crime,  including illicit trafficking of radioactive 
and nuclear material. In the field of  judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the JtL'itice and 
Home Affairs Ministers of  the EU and the CEEC agreed at its meeting on 25 September 1995 
on an action programme to fight international organised crime which tmderlines, amongst other . 
things, the need to sign and ratify the 1980 Convention on the Physical protection ofNuclear 
Material as well as the appropriateness of the criminalization of the theft and trafficking in 
radioactive and nuclear material not covered by the  1980 Convention. 
With regard to the relations of  the EU with Russia, combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear and 
radioactive  substances  was  identified by the K4 Committee  as  one of the  matters  which 
should be fostered according to the Conclusions of  the General Affairs Cotmcil of  November 
1995. 
ffiNOlJSlONS 
ll1e Commission considers that the activities described above to a certain extent fulfil the mandate 
given it by the f:<..Ssen European Cotmcil. In some areas the EUs work and decision-lTh:'lking needs to 
be taken further and speeded up,  in conjtmction with non-EC partners. The Commission is ready to 
present the necessary proposals and will continue the work already well tmder way. It also considers 
that these activities represent a substantial degree of implementation by the EU of  the programme of 
action against nuclear traOicking adopted at the Moscow Nuclear Summit, to whose preparation the 
EU contributed. In the field of cooperation on justice and home affairs the Commission will work 
closely with the EDU and international organizations to lTh:'lke a constructive contribution to Member 
State initiatives implementing the Essen conclusions. 
9 CUOPERATION \Vl1H 1liE  REPUDUCS OF 1HE FORMER USSR 
UNDER 1liE  EXISTING CON1RACIUAL FRAME\IDRK 
Partner.;hip agreement with Ru<>sia 
Annex 1 
Article 84 of  the Agreement signed on 26 June 1994 deals with cooperation on the prevention of  illicit 
activities. This is ba..c;;ed on two-way consultations and close interaction; technical and administrative 
assistance is also provided. Implementation of cooperation activities under this article is determined 
by specialist Council working parties. 
An agreement with Russia covering trade in nuclear materials is expected to bC concluded by January 
next year and this might incorporate provision for measures to prevent nuclear trafficking. 
Pmtnetship agreement with Delant<> 
TI1c  agreement  signed  on  6 March  1995  contains  a clause  (Article  79)  specifically  on  nuclear 
trafficking which reads as follows:  "The parties agree on the necessity to make efforts to cooperate, 
within  the  framework  of their  respective  powers  and  competences,  in  order  to  combat  nuclear 
smuggling.  Cooperation in this area should include exchange of information, technical  support for 
analysing and identifying the material, administrative and technical a<>sistance for the installation of 
cfiicient customs control.  Further cooperation in this field could be identified as need arises." 
Agreements lmve also been concluded with Ulmline, Moldova,  Kyq~yzst'Ul and Knzaldl<>t'liL 
The  first  three  make  no  mention  of the  prevention  of illicit  activities  but  the  agreement  with 
Kazakhstan incorporates a clause providing for cooperation in this field,  i.e. the same as Article 84 
of the ar:,lfeement with Russia. 
The agreements with Gcoq;a, Anncnin (initialled 15 December 1995) and with Azerhtijan (initialled 
18 December 1995) also contain provision for certain aspects of  prevention of illicit activities. 
All the partnership and cooperation agreements provide: 
either for an agreement on trade in nuclear products (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan, 
or for the possibility of such an agreement if necessary,  failing which the Euratom 
Treaty applies (Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan). 
10 Annex 2 
CD-OPERATION TN TilE FIEf]) OF SAFFflUARDS 
Introduction 
1.  TI1e co-operation between Euratom and the Russian Federation in the field of  safeguards 
was initiated in 1992 and formalised in 1993.  Member States of  the European Union, 
the  European  Parliament  and  the  Commission  realised that  immediate  efforts  were 
required to cooperate in the field of  nuclear safeguards  with CIS (Commonwealth of 
Independent States) republics, including, notably, the Russian Federation. The objectives 
were: 
•  To upgrade the nuclear materials accountancy and control system in CIS republics 
to  the  same  standards  as  those  maintained  in  countries  which  have  substantial 
nuclear programmes. 
•  To  help  to  ensure  that  such  a  system  would  comply  with  the  safeguards 
requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and; 
•  As a consequence, to contribute to the non-proliferation of  nuclear materials and to 
the  minimisation of hazards  to  the  public  through the  illicit transfer of nuclear 
materials. 
2.  Due  to  the  need  to  make  optimum usc  of the  limited  resources,  a first  phase  of co-
operation with the Russian Federation \vas carried out during 1993 and  1994, following 
the  provision  of funds  by  the  European  Parliament  under  budget  line  B4-2001.  A 
meticulous co-ordination stmcture- i.e.  project-oriented- was agreed with the Russian 
authorities that proved efficient in respect of transparency, doctunentation of  the results, 
prqjcct management and resource allocation. 
3.  ·  TI1c permanent participants in this co-operation arc: 
•  Gosatomnadzor (GAN) -the Russian federal  inspectorate; 
•  the Ministry of Atomic Eneq,l)' of Russia (Minatom) which is the mqjor nuclear 
operator in Russia; 
•  the Euratom Safeguards Directorate (DCS), 00 XVII-E, and 
•  the Community's Joint Research Centre (JRC). 
Moreover, right from the start, participation and support were requested and obtained from 
Member  State  authorities  and,  notably,  from  operators  of nuclear  installations  in  the 
European Union.  Without this support the training activities performed during the first 
phase would have remained largely academic. 
4.  A first phase of  the co-operation - essentially related to training and the elaboration and 
discussion  of concepts  and  approaches  - was  completed  at  the  end  of 1994;  three 
application projects (sec below) were initiated as a second phase of the co-operation in 
1995, in parallel with continuation of seminars and training activities. 
Results of the first phase 
5.  TI1e  action._c:;  carried out in  1993 and  1994 may be subdivided as follows: 
•  Training and familiarisation; 
•  Nuclear materials control system design; 
•  Seminars; 
•  Inspection exercises. 
11 The  objectives  of these  actions  were  to  familiarise  the  Russian  participants  with the 
preparation, execution and evaluation/conclusion of  inspections as carried out by Euratom 
In December  1994 the experience gained was evaluated during a workshop.  The main 
conclusions  were that  inspection activities  or exercises  provided essential  'on the job' 
training and that they should be e}.]Jandcd to further types of installations. 
6.  . The cost of  the first phase of  the Euratom -Russian Federation co-operation in safeguards 
amounted to  1.5 Mio ECU.  This expenditure was financed from the budget line, made 
available by the European Parliament.  · 
The Second Phase of the Co-operation 
7.  After completion of the first phase of the Euratom - Russian Federation co-operation in 
safeguards, the Russian side officially proposed four major projects,< 1) all relating to the 
practical  implementation  of Nuclear  Material  Accountancy  and  Control  (NMAC)  in 
Russia,  ba<>cd on the results of the first phase described earlier.  One of  the projects had 
to be abandoned.  TI1ree arc pursued with success.  These projects, usually coded MINS, 
PROCS and CISNER-project, are described in some detail  later in the document.  The 
Russian  side  has  outlined  on  record  the  vital  importance  of all  these  projects,  their 
appreciation of  the work performed and the usefulness of  the results achieved, which they 
described a<>  very significant and essential. 
8.  The idea underlying the applications projects was that the Russian experts would achieve 
the design of relevant systems,  concepts  and approaches through day-to-day contacts, 
discussions and co-operation with the corresponding Euratom staff, while the necessary 
design tools (e.g. computers, doctuncntation) and infrastructure would be made available 
by the Commission. 
9.  Further projects have been added to this list during the meeting of  the Joint Co-ordination 
Group (JCG)  in December  1995.  Amongst these,  it is envisaged to prepare a further 
"Physical Inventory-Taking and Verification Project (PITY)" in complex nuclear facilities. 
TI1is project is proposed to include: 
•  The utilisation of  Euratom experience in methodological aspects for the development 
of the methods and procedures at the selected installations; 
•  The practical execution of physical inventory-takings and verification; 
•  Testing of Euratom safeguards equipment and instruments during the practical part 
of  the project; 
•  Training in nuclear material accounting and physical inventory-taking of the plant 
personnel at the research centre. 
10.  TI1c total cost is evaluated to be some six million ECU, of  which the Euratom contribution 
is  estimated at  about  3 MECU  for  1996  and  was  about  1.8  Mio  ECU  for  1995;  the 
Russian side is expected to contribute at  lea<>t  the same amount but mainly in terms of 
manpower. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
11.  From the first 3 years of the Euratom - Russian Federation co-operation in the field of 
safeguards it may be concluded that: 
•  The training and design phm;c  Wds completed by the end of 1994. 
(1)  Later reduced  to 3 due to difficulties of access to data for Gosatomnadzor inspectors. 
12 •  The  second-project  oriented-phase  mu..<;t  be  encouraged  and  pursued  because  it 
appears  to  be  the  best  means  to  introduce  effective  modem  nuclear  material 
accotmtancy  and  control  be  involving  a maximum of executive  staff from  the 
beginning. 
•  The results arc encouraging and their value has been officially recognised by the 
Russian p..mners as significant and essential; 
•  Some  practical  problems  arc,  however,  impeding  faster  progress:  the  language 
barrier,  the  obtaining of visas  for  Russian  experts  at  short  notice,  problems  of 
logistics such as transport of instnunents to Russia, limited manpower resources. 
•  Euratom safeguards has also benefited from this co-operation,  as DCS starr were 
required  to  reflect  on  and  to  describe  Euratom  safeguards  to  outsiders  who 
professionally reviewed its methodology and practices. 
•  TI1c ftmds  made available by Parliament were sufficient. 
DErAILED INFORMATION 
ON 11-IE ONGOING PROJECfS 
1.  MINA ffiM CFNrnAUSED INFORMATION SVSillM (the MINS project) 
1.1.  Project clcscrintion 
TI1e  MINS  project (MINATOM Computerised NMAC Information System) was  established 
jointly  between  Minatorn,  the  main  operator  of the  Russian  Federation  and  the  Euratom 
Safeguards  Directorate.  It  comprises  the  study,  design.  specification,  realisation  and 
implementation  of a centralised  and  computerised  information  system  for  Minatom.  It was 
decided that MINS should concentrate at first on a centralised headquarters system, linked to 
computerised work places at two nuclear power plants, at one Low Enriched Uranitun (LEU) 
fuel H1brication plant and at the controlling operator organisation(s). The outcome of  the project 
should provide Minatom with a solid informatics and accountancy platform, which must enable 
the various  users  to  gain experience with a computerised system and which the responsible 
Russian organisations can subsequently extend to a comprehensive computerised NMAC system 
for the entire fuel  cycle in the Russian Federation. 
'fl1e general objectives of the MINS project can be summarised as follows: 
development of a regulatory framework and accompanying document 
improvement of the centralised information (headquarters) system 
improvement of the NMAC system at facility level (computerised work stations) 
MINS  includes  the  following  features:  high  system  reliability,  optimum  usc  of modem 
technology for fast and secure information transmission and processing, exiensive database for 
storage and management of NMAC data. 
Given the scope of the project, the following  organisation~ participate: 
•  MINATOM,  the  Ministry  of Atomic  Energy  of the  Russian  Federation,  which  is  the 
requesting Authority and eventually responsible for the implementation; 
•  TSNJIAtominform, which is a large research and infommtion handling institute depending 
from Minato~  a specially created section of  Atominform has been entrusted to carry out the 
majority of the work involved in MINS; 
13 •  ROSENERGOATOM: a public organisation ('operator organisation') grouping and supervising 
most of the RF nuclear power plants; 
•  lVEL, the  public  organisation  ('operator  organisation')  to  which  belongs  the  LEU  fuel 
fabrication plant at Novosibirsk; 
•  VNIIA, scientific research institute for automation; 
•  VNIINM, scientific research institute for inorganic materials; 
•  GOSATOMNADZOR, the RF federal safeguards Authority; 
•  ElJRATOM, the partner providing information and expertise. 
1.2  Project evolution and statu~ 
The MINS project was started officially in September 1994.  The period from September 1994 
to July 1995 allowed both sides to get to know each other's working methods, to organise fact 
finding missions and to establish a preliminary work schedule. 
The current project team comprises 21  team members (7 from Euratom) plus an additional  10 
to  15 specialists on the Russian side who get involved depending on specific tasks to be carried 
out.  The project is expected to be completed by the end of 1999. 
As a result of  intensive periods of  information exchange, the Russian experts issued a substantial 
number oftcchnical notes including a detailed feasibility report.  The system's architecture had 
been drawn up and relevant documents have been translated and discussed in technical meetings. 
Today the pr~ject has arrived at a turning point: the nuclear power plants to be included in MINs 
were chosen to be Kalilnin (WWER1000) and Smolensk (RBMK 1000). The fuel  fabrication 
plant  will  be  the  LEU  plant  at  Novosibirsk.  Each  will  be  equipped  with  appropriate 
computerized workstations.  Also the operator organisation ROSENERGOATOM, controlling 
the  nuclear  power  plants  and  the  central  MfNATOM office  itself will  receive  appropriate 
workstations. 
With the initial analysis and feasibility completed, the focus  is now on equipment acquisition 
and  installation,  specific  training  and  preparation  for  the  programming  of the  database 
management system. A first delivery of equipment is reasonably expected for mid  1996. 
2.  PHYSICAL TNVFNmi~Y  TAKING J>ROCFDURF.S: the PROC project 
2.1.  Project descripHon 
l11e  PROC  project  was  established  between  Minatom,  Gosatomnadzor  and  the  Euratom 
.Srrfuguards Directorate for the development of joint recommendations on Physical Inventory 
1~1king (Pin PROCedures at WWER-1 000 Nuclear Power Plants and a LEU Fuel Fabrication 
Plant. 
The intention was to cover the whole range of activities relating to physical inventory taking: 
accounting system arrangements, records audit, documentation, physical preparation, organisation. 
2.2.  Project cvoln1ion ami  statu~ 
'The project work started in July 1994 and was finalised in  Febmary 1996. 
•  l11e specific plants chosen for the exercise were the Kalinin WWER-1 000 Nuclear Power 
Plant and the NOVOSIBIRSK LEU Fuel Fabrication Plant.  Technical information about 
plant operations, material accounting arrangements and, in particular, on physical inventory 
14 procedures has been provided by the operators.  Both plants have been visited by the project 
team to review the information provided and examine the materials accotmting and physical 
inventory arrangements. 
•  The  second  stage  \vas  the  production  of the  docwnents.  Euratom  provided  general 
recommendations  on  physical  inventory  taking  and  this  was  translated  into  Russian, 
discussed  and  agreed.  Following  this  Euratom  produced  two  documents  providing 
recommendations on physical inventory taking in Nuclear Power Plants and in LEU Fuel 
Fabrication Plants.  Finally the operator (Minatom),  on the basis of the agreed guideline 
documents,  produced  specific  PIT procedures  for  the  Kalinin  and  Novosibirsk  plants, 
including operational preparation, inventory methods, evaluation etc. 
•  It was agreed that the 5 documents produced in the project ( each available in English and 
Russian) would be implemented in the following project (PI1V- full PIT exercises followed 
by physical inventory verification (PIV) by Gosatomnadzor). The documents may then be 
reviewed in the light of experience. 
3.  JlHVSTCAL TNVFNTDRV TAKING ANO VERIFICATION; the PI1V Project 
3.1.  Pmjcct description 
This PI1V project is a follow-up project of the PROC project. It will offer the opporttmity to 
apply, test and evaluate in practice the documents produced during the PROC and PI1V projects. 
Therefore all three organisations involved are very interested in the results of this project. 
TI1c PI1V project was established between Minatom, Gosatomnadzor (GA~D  and the Euratom 
.sn..fuguards  Directorate  (ESD)  for  two  consecutive  Physical  Inventory  Takings  (Pl1)  with 
Euratom participation at Kalinin Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and Novosibirsk LEU t:1brication 
plant  based on the  recommendations  and  procedures  produced during the above  referred to 
PROC project, and Physical Inventory Verifications (PIV) performed by GAN according to PIV 
recommendations and procedures to be developed during this project. 
The intention is to apply, test and if necessary revise the recommendations and procedures for 
PITs  produced  during  the  previous  PROC  project  and  to  develop  recommendations  and 
procedures for PIVs. To cover a complete Material Balance Period (MBP) two consecutive PITs 
will be performed at Kalinin NPP and the Novosibirsk LEU fabrication plant followed by PIVs 
performed by GAN after the second PITs. 
3.2.  Project evolution :mel statu-. 
3.2.1.  The  project  has  just  started  with  a preliminary  meeting  between  the  three  above-
mentioned organisations in February 1996 in Luxembourg and is expected to be finalised 
in  1998. 
3.2.2.  'I11e initial PITs at the two installations chosen will be performed probably towards the 
end of 1996. 
3.2.3.  TI1e second PITs closing the MBPs arc planned for the end of 1997, followed by the 
PIVs performed by GAN.  Usc of measurement instrumentation and computers will be 
considered ior PITs and PIVs. 
15 4.  ffiMPUTERTSEO NUQ_,FAR MA  TERTAL AU:OUNTING; the CISNER Project 
4.1.  Project description 
The CISNER project was established jointly between C'JQsatomnadzor (GAN), the Russian federal 
control agency, and the Euratom Safeguards Directorate for the development and implementation 
of a computerised nuclear material accmmting and ,Control Information System for the North-
European Region of Gosatomnadzor (GAN). 
TI1c system to be developed will be a multi-level nuclear material accounting and control system 
involving all  the  levels  of information  flow  from  the  plant  operator,  over  the  local  GAN 
inspector, the GAN ficld office up to the GAN Regional Headquarters in St. Petersburg.  The 
system will have following features and characteristics : rapid transmission and processing of 
information, high reliability of  the information transmitted and processed, high system reliability, 
reduction of routine work to a minimum. creation and maintenance of a database for nuclear 
material accounting and control in the North European Region of  GAN and the development of 
computerised tools to optimise decision making. 
4.2.  Project evolution nnd  stntu~> 
The actual project work started in November 1994 and is expected to be finalised in December 
1997. 
The project started with the analysis of the existing nuclear material accountancy and control 
systems in the installations which arc part of  the project. Visits to the installations were made: 
these have shown that in most of  the cases some form oflocal nuclear material systems existed 
and  in some cases were being updated to  include,  eventually,  requirements  for  international 
safeguards. 
TI1c  visits  also  revealed  that  the  actual  inspection· work  of Gosatomnadzor  is  limited  to 
accmmtancy  and  consistency  checks.  Physical  verifications  arc  marginal  as  no  safeguards 
equipment, e.g. NDA instrun1ents, seals or surveillance systems, is available.  It was therefore 
decided  to  enlarge  the  CISNER project to  include  the  procurement  and  installation of the 
safeguards instnm1cntation necessary to control the plants and training of the Gosatomnadzor 
inspectors in the use of the equipment. 
In parallel the work on the development of  the computerised data handling and treatment system 
started.  TI1e  data  flow  related  to  nuclear  material  accountancy  and  control  involve  the 
installations themselves, the local Gosatomnadzor inspector, the Gosatomnadzor field offices in 
Sosnovy Bor,  Murmansk,  Scverodinsk,  Kurchatov and  Dcsnogorsk and  the North European 
District Directorate of St. Petersburg. 
In order to divide the project into manageable item..<;, a pilot project was defined involving one 
· nuclear power plant and all levels of  commtmication from the plant operator, via the local and 
field oflices of Gosatomnadzor, to the main regional Gosatomnadzor oflice of St. Petersburg. 
The  pilot  project  has  been  defined  in  detail,  hardware  and  software  procurement  and 
development is under way.  It is expected that the first equipment will be delivered by mid 96. 
After successful testing of  the pilot system, the system will be expanded to the other installations 
of the project based on a priority list defined by Gosatomnadzor. 
16 Projects implemented or under p~mtion 
in the fmrncworl< of Plmre and Tacis 
I.  f'_n-o~mtion with the Ru~sian Fedcmtion on illicit tmfficlrlng 
Annex  3 
Co-operation in design and development of a data base system for the identification of  nuclear 
material of lllknown origin 
Partner :  Non Organic Chemistry Institute, Moscow 
Objective: 
a)  definition of characteristic parameters of nuclear material used in the countries of the FSU. 
b)  establishment  of characteristics  of processes  and  production  facilities  (reprocessing,  fuel 
fabrication, reactors, enrichment plants) for individtml plants in the FSU. 
c)  selection of materials which should be further characterized and kept in an archive at ITU for 
reference purposes. 
d)  completion of the ITU data bac:;e  with general data from the former COMECON states and a 
more detailed data base at the Non-Oq,laJlic Chemistry Institute. 
c)  elaboration of  a consultation scheme to analyse and intcrpretc analytical results by means of  the 
data bases at ITU and the Non-Organic Chemistry Institute. 
11.  OlO~mtion with the  Ru~sian Fedemtion  on  the  un:gnuling of the  safegnanls  and Nuclear 
Mate1ial  Accormtahility and Omhnl (NMAQ system 
II-1.  Review of Needs 
As  explained in the previous Commtmication, the  knowledge and assessment of the detailed 
technical needs for the creation of a NMAC system is fundamental for the effectiveness of the 
co-operation with the Russian Federation in establishing a technical infrastmcture. 
1l1ercfore, the Commission proceeded with a re-assessment of  these needs in close cooperation 
with the Russian authorities, MINATOM and GAN, taking into account the specificity and the 
c>..1ent of  the nuclear fuel cycle to be safeguarded and the type of  safeguards system that will be 
applied: 
a)  at the facility level: 
each nuclear facility must have a detailed nuclear material accountancy system for all the nuclear 
material  that  is  received,  shipped  processed  or  stored.  Accurate  measurements  and  the 
uncertainty of these measurements arc required. 
Needs: a study defining the specificity ofNMAC for the different parts of  the fuel cycle has to 
be performed. Training, regulatory aspects and the establishment of  facility specific mles arc very 
important at  the  initial  stage of implementation of the new safeguards system.  Furthermore, 
needs:  for  each  type  of facility,  appropriate  material  balance  and  statistical  accountancy 
evaluation procedures, as well as a list of the most appropriate instmments and measurement 
systems has to be established. The necessary technical support and training have to be provided 
for this purpose. 
b)  at the authority level: 
the inspectors have to verify, in an  inclcJE_ndcn~ way, the declarations made by the individtml 
plant operators.  . 
Needs:  this  implies training of inspectors and facility personnel  in charge of accounting and 
indcpendant analytical capabilities, as well as a computerised data base for the collection, the 
retrieval  and  the  analysis  of the  accmmtancy  data  and  for  the  collection  of the  inspectors 
findings.  Measurement  techniques  adapted  to  each  type  of plant  and  the  respective  proper 
instmmentation has to be made available for inspections. 
17 II-2.  r-<.c~ucation. Training and Development of Safegtmrds Methodologies 
As mentionned in§ II.-5.a) of  the docwnent, the Russian Federation has decided in March, 1995 
to create the !'Russian Safeguards Methodological and Training Centre", called RMfC, at the 
Institute of Physics  and  Power  Engineering  (IPPE)  at  Obninsk  in  the  Kaluga  Region,  ncar 
Moscow.  The RMfC will be mainly oriented towards the training of inspectors and of plant 
operators depending from MINATOM and other organisations. 
TI1c Centre will be realized modifying existing premises, already licenced for the usc of bulk 
quantities of  nuclear materials (U, Pu). The structures will consist of  class  rooms for theoretical 
lessons  and  of laboratories  where  hands-on  training  will  be  given  on  nuclear  materials 
measurements.Instnunents will be provided through Commission (TACIS) support, as well as 
nuclear material standards and reference materials. 
TI1e education and training programme is  made-up of basic courses that will  be common for 
inspectors  and  plant  operators  (Principles  of NMA&C,  verification  techniques)  as  well  as 
specific courses for separatly operator or inspectors, regarding NMA or inspection procedures. 
A study is now being performed by the JRC,  IPPE (MINATOM) and GAN to determine the 
detailed technical specifications for each of  the course modules (taking accmmt of  the quite new 
Russian legislation), the required training facilities, the instrwnentation, the reference materials 
and data evaluation capabilities. 
For the first phase of  the implementation of  the training centre, the JRC and IPPE arc now co-
operating, in the framework ofthe TACIS programme, to create five training courses, addressing 
specific evaluation and measurement techniques of  interest both to plant operators and inspectors. 
The first courses  for trainers will be organised in the ncar future at the JRC,  Ispra.  The  first 
training courses at IPPE, Obninsk, arc expected to start in June  1996. 
Furthermore,  upon  special  request  by  GAN,  measurement  techniques  oriented  courses  and 
physical  inventory verification exercises have been and will  be orf,'llilised at the  JRC.  TI1ese 
courses will be transferred to Obninsk, when the RMfC will be fully operational. 
The RMTC is also very important as a forwn and a meeting point between plant operators and 
inspectors. 1l1cy would, through discussions and common seminars, tmderstand their respective 
obligations and how these can be complied with given the present state of  the Russian nuclear 
industry. An R&D programme on safeguards concepts and methodologies is also expected to be 
put in place as the RMfC develops. 
II-3.  C'JCncric Scientific and Technical Support 
As the Commission stressed in its previous Communication, the setting up of a fully reliable 
safeguards and NMAC system needs specific installations for operators and/or inspectors. The 
modalities for the establishment of  these installations arc still under discussion with the Russian 
authorities. The main lines, as well as the location have already been agreed and a mission of 
Commission experts is expected in Russia soon in order to elaborate with Rtl<>sian specialists the 
terms of reference for these projects. 
1l1e  purpose  of the  proposed  cooperation  is  the .  provtston  of consultancy  to  GAN  and 
MINATOM,  the  exchange  of practical  experience.  It is  also  envisaged  to  provide  some 
instrwnentation  but  this  will  depend  on  the  availability  of relevant  equipment  in  Russian 
laboratories. 
II.3.1.  Metrological Centre for Mcnsurcmcnts ofNuclear Materials 
In co-operation with experts of different laboratories, it should: 
18 a)  define the state of the practice for routine applications of different measurement techniques 
applied to nuclear materials, 
b)  provide  a  basis  for  a  quality  control  progmmme  to  regularly  monitor  the  measurement 
capabilities in different facilities and in analytical laboratories. 
II.3.2.  .Sill~guards Analytical C1pahilities 
The samples taken by safeguards inspectors need to be analysed with a high level of  accuracy 
by destructive analysis  techniques and  in some  specific cases also by non-destructive assay 
methods. 
GAN  has  expressed  a  great  interest  in  establishing  the  technical  capabilities  and  required 
infrastructure to implement various approaches, according to the specific needs. Furthermore, the 
independent analysis of "vagabonding, material  is also a requirement  gaining an increasing 
interest. 
II.3.3.  Tnstmmcnt Development and Procurement 
Very few instruments arc used at present in Russian nuclear facilities for the implementation of 
NMAC system. However, several laboratories in the Russian Federation have a large experience 
in the development of  instnunentation for process and quality control in production £1cilities and 
nuclear measurements for sensitive equipment in research centres. 
The purpose of  the co-operation between Russian and European R&D laboratories and industry 
is to: 
a)  review the existing technologies available and evaluate their possible usc or adaptation to NMAC 
purposes, 
b)  define  specific  projects  aiming  at  the  development  of new  instnuncnts  suited  to  the 
implementation of NMAC. 
On the basis ofthc results obtained, relations should be established between the Russian industry 
or production laboratories and European indLL'>try,  in order to develop an industrial production 
of instnunentation in Russia. 
III.  C.o-o~rntion with Jlhare countries on illicit trnficl<inf,! 
ITI-1.  FONSAFE (Forensic Nuclear Analysis for Safeguards) Prqject with Hun~ 
Partner :  Htmgarian Atomic Energy Commission 
Ol;jective : 
a)  improve the capacities for analysis of  nuclear material seized in Hungary particularly in the field 
of NDA measurements of  the nuclide concentrations ofU and Pu and NDA  determination of 
the matrix. 
b)  organise intercomparisons of NDA measurements and equipment. 
c)  extend the data base at I1U by all the related data and results of  measurements made accessible 
by the Institute of Isotopes,  which  is  responsible  for  the  identification and  measurement of 
nuclear material seized in Hungary. 
d)  establish a procedure to assist Htmgary - upon request - in the  measurements  of the  seized 
nuclear material and in the definition of its origin and intended use including: 
- measurements in ITU on sub samples provided by Htmgary or on the seized material itself, in 
case ofPu, with the understanding that the remaining material will be shipped back to Hungary, 
- common analysis and interpretation of the results based on the ITU database. 
c)  receive a Hungarian expert for about a month, who will study the experience acquired in the 
above field. 
III-2.  FONSAFE Prqject with the Czech Republic 
Partner :  State Office for Nuclear Safety of the Czech Republic 
Ol;jcctive : 
19 A.  In the beginning, a supplementary analysis of  nuclear material seized in the Czech Republic will 
be performed at ITU. For eflicient transfer of  k11ow-how and experience, two Czech experts arc to bC 
involved in the following activities for twice three months and once six months: 
1)  shipment of a sample of the  highy-enriched uranium (HEU)  material  seized  in Prague  from 
November 1994 to June 1995 to ITU for extended analyses covering radionuclidc and chemical 
impurities; 
2)  evaluation of analytical data for revelation of  the possible origin of the material; 
3)  development of selected parts of a relational database system for nuclear material at ITU. 
B.  In the second phase the contractor and his experts will assist NRI in the following tasks: 
1)  upgrading of laboratory equipment of  Central Analytical Laboratory in order to improve the in-
hou.<>e  analytical capabilities; 
2)  analysis of l-IEU reference materials from the former Soviet Union. 
C.  One or two  workshops  with Czech and EU representatives  arc  to  be organized to exchange 
experience in the area of treatment and analysis of nuclear material. 
III-3.  Other FONSAFE Prqjects 
Similar  but  country  - specific  projects  arc  in  preparation  for  Bulgaria  and  Ukraine  (more 
emphasis on assistance in on-site handling and identification of  radioactive materials by NDA). 
Furthermore, the other Phare countries have expressed their interest for similar collaboration. 
IV.  Cn-o~mtion  in the fr.uncworl{ of the TSTC 
IV-1.  TSTC prqjcd 40 
Project Purpose: to develop an upgraded approach for safeguarding complex & sensitive nuclear 
fuel cycle facilities at Tornsk 7. 
E:\JlCCted Results of the Project  \\~II consist of: 
a)  development of  ref,JUlatory criteria applicable for nuclear material accountancy at specific types 
of fuel  cycle  facilities,  based  on  feasibility  studies  for  measurement  systems  development, 
application of  inspectorate field equipment, application of  containment and surveillance measures; 
b)  development of regulatory requirements for inspection procedures and scope; 
c)  development of a model approach for nuclear material data transmission and data treatment in 
regional supervising office; 
1l1e Russian participants arc corning from GAN,  Minatom, the Tornsk 7 Chemical Plant and 
several institutes. 
IV-2.  ISTC project K-57 
Creation of  system for storage, operative control and physical protection of  nuclear materials and 
ampoule  sources  of ionizing  radiation  (ASIR)  on  "Baikal-1"  stand  complex  meeting  the 
international requirements of radioactive materials control and accounting. 
Partner  :  Institute  of Atomic  Energy  of the  National  Nuclear  Center  of the  Republic  of 
Kazakhstan 
1l1e main objectives of  the project arc focused on the development of  the technology for storing, 
operative  control  and  physical  protection of nuclear  materials  and  ASlR as  well  as  on the 
development and implementation of  systems of control, accounting and physical protection for 
nuclear  materials  and  ampoule  sources  of ionizing radiation stored  on the  "Baikal-I"  Stand 
Complex. 
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